(AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais).
It is time to begin naming the snakes, and there are many.
First, consider this. In order for a fascist regime (big government and big business forming an alliance to totally dominate society from top to bottom) to exist and be successful, it needs a police force to maintain order and to enforce the edicts handed down by the ruling class.
Citizens normally resist when they finally wake up to the fact that their government has become an oppressive, malevolent force. Thus, an apparatus must be put into place to minimize such civil unrest.
Rumors have been afloat for months alluding to the possibility that Barack Obama has begun to lay the groundwork for such a police force. Some have seen it in the healthcare bill. Others have seen it in Cap and Trade legislation. Still others have insisted that the U.S. military has been training a special domestic force to help police with 'crowd control' in the event of massive civil unrest--the program called 'Consequence Management Response Force.'
And then there was the report that Obama had revised an Executive Order issued initially by Ronald Reagan, the revision of which would allow INTERPOL to operate on U.S. soil with immunity from the restrictions and requirements of the Constitution.
Each time such suggestions have been made, vehement denials have proceeded in response.
But when one takes a cold, hard look at what the Obama government and the U.S. Army--in conjunction with a large corporation--have been doing with regard to a new police force, it is difficult to explain it all away and even more difficult to engage in denials.
In 2009, the U.S. Army under the directive of the Administration in Washington, called for the Rand Corporation to conduct a major study on the need for, feasibility, and cost of a 'stability police force for the United States.'
That report was issued in 2009 under Contract Number W74V8H-C-0001, and Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for Rand's publication, ISBN 978-0-8330-4653-6, and states the following (Direct link to Rand .pdf file):
This project investigates the need for a U.S. Stability Police Force, the
major capabilities it would need if created, where in the federal government
it would best be headquartered, and how it should be staffed. In
doing so, it considers options based in the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and State. The project was conducted
for the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI). Its purpose was to make recommendations to PKSOI, the
Army, and the community of rule-of-law researchers, practitioners, and
policymakers on the need for (and characteristics of) a U.S. Stability
This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s
Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center,
part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and
development center sponsored by the United States Army.
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is ATFCR07234. The most serious revelation of all, however, is found in the report's recommendations and conclusions:
This study asks several questions. First, is a Stability Police Force (SPF)
necessary? An SPF is a high-end police force that engages in a range
of tasks such as crowd and riot control, special weapons and tactics
(SWAT), and investigations of organized criminal groups. In its ability
to operate in stability operations, it is similar to such European forces
as the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie. Its focus on highend
tasks makes it fundamentally different from UN or other civilian
police, who deal with more routine law and order functions. It is also
different from most military forces, which are generally not trained
and experienced to conduct policing tasks in a civilian environment.
Second, if an SPF is necessary, what should it look like? This includes
considering such issues as: its objectives, tasks, and size; its speed of
deployment; its institutional capabilities; where it should be headquartered
in the U.S. government and how it should be staffed (standing
force, reserve force, and hybrid force); and its cost.
Our conclusions are based on several facts and assumptions. First,
it would be optimal to have SPF personnel with civilian police skills,
orientation, and perspective do high-end policing. This is because civilian
police have more experience working with the civilian population
than do military personnel under normal circumstances. Additionally,
police skills are created and maintained only by constant use, and only
police forces that work daily with civilians can exercise the maximum
number of SPF policing functions among the civilian population.
The Rand Report is 213 pages long and goes into great detail concerning creating this new 'high end' police force to work along side of the military and civilian police to 'maintain the rule of law.'
Second, we assume that a new agency would be difficult to establish.
It would be politically challenging and face resistance from a range
of organizations in the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security,
and State currently engaged in policing. It would need some additional
overhead, and would take significant time to establish. All personnel
and all additional administrative overhead personnel would have to be
recruited. Training facilities and programs would have to be created
and established, rather than modified or expanded, as they would have
to be if an SPF becomes part of an existing agency.
The problem is that nowhere in this study or in its final recommendations is the U.S. Constitution ever mentioned as a prohibitive factor in the implementation of such a broad-based, far-reaching, and all-pervasive policing agency. The only exception is a brief reference to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prevents the military from engaging in domestic law enforcement.
And the Rand Report states that 'without relief from this constraint, it (the program) could not take advantage of the hybrid staffing option (military and civilian together) to develop and maintain the needed skills.'
While the report refers extensively to the ability of such a special force to be deployed overseas in military missions, nowhere does it place any restriction whatsoever upon the force from being used in domestic law enforcement here at home. In fact, the report specifically designates the stability police force as a possible method by which the Department of Homeland Security can maintain 'civilian stability' within the United States in the event of a terrorist attack or some other national emergency.
This is further born out by the fact that the report cites the possibility that such a new policing agency could be made a part of the Department of Justice.
The question, thus, becomes, why would such a new national police agency be needed, particularly when it is clear the intention is to use it here at home as well as overseas? What is developing behind the scenes that would make such a force necessary? Is the government, and large corporations, expecting massive civil unrest? Why?
These issues will be examined in the next segment, along with some more 'naming of the snakes.'